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“Small countries have long feared economic dominance by their larger 
neighbours.”  
Donald R. Davis (1998), p. 1264.  
 
Although there is almost universal support for free trade by economists, the average 
non-economist is less convinced (see Poole (2004)) for a comparison of attitudes 
towards trade by economists and non-economists). One of the views of the anti-
globalisation protesters at the WTO conference in Seattle in 1999 and elsewhere is that 
smaller countries tend to get “exploited” by larger countries, who are able to impose 
“unfair” terms of trade. Such views are also echoed by some such as Chang (2008). 
However, this is exactly the opposite of standard models of international trade, in 
which a small country gains more from trade than does a large country. This is because 
a large country is more willing to trade than a small country; this willingness to trade 
pushes the terms of trade against a large country, leading to smaller gains from trade. 
 
Underlying the anti-globalisation ideas is the notion that larger countries have more 
power than small countries, whereas in standard models of trade, large countries have 
less power than small countries. In the next section, we show empirically that the anti-
globalisation idea has bite: there is indeed a positive association between country size 
and the terms of trade, in a large panel of countries from 1980 to 2014. Motivated by 
this finding, we proceed to develop a model in which this empirical finding holds true. 
In the model, when two countries trade with each other, the equilibrium price emerges 
as a result of Nash bargaining between the two countries. When bargaining power 
depends on the size of the economy, the equilibrium price (henceforth, the Nash 
bargaining price) is indeed one in which the terms of trade are in favour of the country 
with the larger economy. This is in contrast with the results of standard models, and 
is consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Section 2.  
 
However, the presence of this positive association between country size and the terms 
of trade does not necessarily mean that the larger economy will gain more from trade 
than the smaller economy. The larger economy may also gain less than the smaller 
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economy, and may even experience a welfare loss relative to autarky12. This potential 
loss arises because incomplete specialisation of the larger country is the norm under 
Nash bargaining3. As the terms of trade move in favour of the larger country, those 
who are employed in the country’s comparative disadvantage sector will lose, and they 
will represent an increasing fraction of the country’s employment, the larger is the 
larger economy relative to its trading partner. Regardless of the welfare effect on the 
larger economy, the smaller economy is always worse off under Nash bargaining than 
under free trade, but better off when compared to autarky. Hence in general the Nash 
bargaining outcome leads to lower world welfare compared to free trade, with most of 
the loss being imposed on the smaller economy.  
 
In the standard Ricardian model, incomplete specialisation of the larger country results 
in all the gains from trade accruing to the smaller country, with free trade prices being 
equal to the larger country’s opportunity cost of production (as in autarky). The second 
main theoretical result of this paper is that the Nash bargaining prices will be different 
from the larger country’s opportunity cost, despite incomplete specialisation. If wages 
are equalised between sectors due to free inter-sectoral movement of labour, this leads 
to profits being generated in the larger country’s comparative advantage sector. If these 
profits are distributed to workers in the same sector, then those employed in the 
comparative advantage sector will gain from trade, while those employed in the 
comparative disadvantage sector will lose. Thus, the model is able to generate within-
country distributional effects of trade, despite there being only one factor of production 
and no heterogeneity across firms.  
 
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, we follow the lead of 
Piccione and Rubinstein (2007) who introduce the concept of a jungle economy in 
which economic transactions are governed by coercion. Using a different definition of 
                                                          
1 Note that this result is stronger than that of Samuelson (2004), who develops a Ricardian model of 
trade in which, when one country experiences a technological improvement in its comparative 
disadvantage sector, its trading partner will experience a terms of trade loss, and therefore be worse off 
than in the initial free trade equilibrium. However, in Samuelson’s model, autarky is never welfare 
superior to trade.  
2 Why would a country engage in trade if it is worse off than in autarky? As will be argued below, it is 
possible that some agents in the economy (workers in the comparative advantage sector) will gain from 
trade. If those who gain from trade are better able to influence government policy than those who lose 
from trade, a country may engage in international trade even if it loses from trade overall.  




power to the one we use, they show, amongst other results, that a jungle equilibrium 
exists and is Pareto efficient. The paper is also related to Baldwin (1948), in which one 
country sets prices while the other country makes its best response to these prices. It 
is also related to the literature on strategic trade policy, in the sense that a policy 
which seems like a good idea for the larger country actually yields an inferior outcome 
due to general equilibrium adjustments (see Krugman (1987)). Ruffin (1988) develops 
a model with different types of labour in which the size of the country is irrelevant to 
the distribution of the gains from trade.  
 
This paper is also related to the literature on trade policy and trade agreements (see 
especially Bagwell and Staiger (2002) and Grossman and Helpman (2002)). In that 
literature, governments bargain over tariffs and other forms of trade policies; in the 
present paper, governments bargain directly over the terms of trade. Broda et al (2008) 
find evidence in support of the idea that countries with market power in international 
markets set higher import tariffs. There is also a literature on the home market effect 
(the idea that large countries have an advantage in sectors produced under increasing 
returns to scale; see Krugman (1980, 1991), Helpman and Krugman (1985), but also 
Davis (1998) for a contrary view). Finally, in its focus on the role of country size in 
international trade, the paper is also related to the literature on the gravity model of 
trade (Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)); in that literature the focus is on the 
relationship between country size and the volume of trade, whereas we investigate the 
relationship between country size and the terms of trade.  
 
Section 2 presents the empirical evidence in support of the idea that larger countries 
have more favourable terms of trade. Section 3 develops the Ricardian model with 
prices being determined by Nash bargaining in free trade. Section 4 presents some 
simulations, and Section 5 provides some concluding comments.  
 
2 Terms of trade and the size of the economy 
 
Our objective in this section is to show empirically that there is a positive association 
between the size of an economy and its terms of trade. Data for this section has been 
obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The main variable of 
interest is the Net Barter Terms of Trade, which is calculated as the percentage ratio 
of the export unit value index to the import unit value index, measured relative to the 
base year 2000. Data is available for an unbalanced panel of 194 countries from 1980 
to 2014, for a total of 4,394 observations. Figure 1 shows the correlation between the 
Net Barter Terms of Trade and GDP at market prices in current US dollars, in 
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logarithms, in 2014, along with a linear best-fit line. There is a clearly positive 
relationship between the Net Barter Terms of Trade and GDP. The slope of the line 
is 0.0217, with a p-value of 0.045, and the correlation between the two variables is 
0.1498.  
 
Turning to more formal econometric evidence, we estimate the following equation, for 
country 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡:  ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾 ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (1) 
In this specification, we include both country and year fixed effects, to control for 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across countries (for example, differences in 
industrial structure across countries), and country-invariant heterogeneity across time 
(for instance, shocks which are common across countries). By controlling for both these 
effects, the coefficient on ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝛾𝛾, is identified through across-time variation within 
country. That is, 𝛾𝛾 shows how the terms of trade changes as a country’s GDP changes.  
 
Figure 1: Scatter of the Net Barter Terms of Trade against GDP, 2014.  
 
 
Of course, the terms of trade may also change for other reasons, for example changes 















Where we also include a country-specific time trend4.  
 
Table 1: Estimating the relationship between the terms of trade and the size of the 
economy.  
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Estimation Method FE FE ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.270 0.317 
 (0.057)*** (0.046)*** ln𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡   
   ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡   
   
R-squared  0.48 0.75 
Observations  4,394 4,394 
Countries 194 194 
Years 1980-2014  1980-2014  
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Country time trend  Yes 
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. 
Estimation is via OLS with country and year fixed effects in column (1), and country and year fixed 
effects and country time trends in column (2).  
 
Table 1 presents the results of these regressions, with standard errors clustered by 
country to control for within-country correlation in the residuals. The first column 
reports fixed effects results without country time trends, while the second column 
includes country time trends. In both columns, the coefficient on GDP is positive and 
highly significant. Adding a country time trend increases the size of the coefficient on 
GDP. The magnitude of the coefficients suggest that a 1 percent increase in the size 




                                                          
4 Additional sensitivity analysis including different model specifications are reported in Appendix A. In 
addition, GDP and the terms of trade are likely to be simultaneously determined. This would bias the 
estimated value of 𝛾𝛾. Since we are interested in establishing the presence of a relationship between the 
two variables, rather than on the direction of causation, we do not attempt to overcome the simultaneity 
bias through the use of instrumental variables.  
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3 Nash Bargaining 
 
In this section we develop a Ricardian-type model of international trade which 
generates the result documented above, that larger countries have more favourable 
terms of trade, and derive the implications of the model. There are two countries, 
Home and Foreign, and two goods, 1 and 2. Labour is the only factor of production. 
Consumer preferences are identical across countries, and are given by:  
𝑈𝑈 = 𝐶𝐶1𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶21−𝛼𝛼                               0 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1    (3) 
Labour is the only factor of production. Endowments of labour in the two countries 
are 𝐿𝐿� and 𝐿𝐿�∗ (Foreign variables are indicated with an asterisk). Without loss of 
generality, let Home be larger than Foreign, 𝐿𝐿� ≥ 𝐿𝐿�∗. Production technologies are given 
by:  
Home:                            𝑄𝑄1 = 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿1                           𝑄𝑄2 = 𝐿𝐿2   (4a) 
Foreign:                        𝑄𝑄1∗ = 𝐿𝐿1∗                              𝑄𝑄2∗ = 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿2∗    (4b) 
Where 𝐴𝐴 > 1 indicates that Home has a comparative (and absolute) advantage in good 
1, and Foreign in good 2. All markets are perfectly competitive.   
 
Note first that the relative prices under autarky are determined by the opportunity 
cost of production in each country, and are equal to the marginal rate of substitution 









                                        𝑝𝑝1∗
𝑝𝑝2
∗ = 𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 𝐶𝐶2∗𝐶𝐶1∗   (5) 
Suppose that the two countries engage in trade. In the Nash bargaining framework, 
the difference in opportunity cost between the two countries can be divided between 
them, depending on their relative bargaining power. Suppose that the bargaining power 
depends only on the size of each country’s economy pre-trade (i.e. in autarky)5. If the 
two countries reach an agreement, the resulting prices are the Nash bargaining prices (𝑜𝑜1 𝑜𝑜2⁄ )𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, and international trade occurs. If the two countries do not reach an 
agreement, then there is no trade, and the two countries revert to their autarkic 
relative prices as given in equation (5). Bargaining is assumed to be costless.  
 
Implicit in the foregoing discussion is the assumption that there is collective decision-
making. Even though there are many, perfectly competitive firms, they delegate the 
                                                          
5 It is also possible to solve the model under the assumption that bargaining power depends on the size 
of the economy after bargaining, but the results do not differ much.  
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price-setting decision to the national government. The Nash bargaining problem is to 






















   (6) 
Where 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿� is Home GDP in autarky, and 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴
∗𝐿𝐿�∗ is Foreign GDP in autarky. 



















∗�   (7a) = 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴∗
𝐴𝐴
+ 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 = 𝐴𝐴2𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴+𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴∗𝐴𝐴      (7b) 
Where 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 = 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿� (𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿� + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴∗𝐿𝐿�∗)⁄  and 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴∗ = 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴∗𝐿𝐿�∗ (𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿� + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴∗𝐿𝐿�∗)⁄  are the shares of the two 
countries in world GDP, in autarky. That is, the relative price under Nash bargaining 
lies somewhere between the autarkic prices of the two countries, with the weights given 
by the relative sizes of the two countries’ economies. If the Home economy is larger 
than Foreign economy, the free trade price will be closer to the autarkic price of 
Foreign. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of activities in the Nash Bargaining model.  
 
 
3.1 The sectoral allocation of labour 
 
In the conventional analysis (as laid out in Appendix B), free trade prices are 
determined by the simultaneous determination of demand and supply. As a result, all 
markets clear, and each country chooses a production bundle which maximises the 
                                                          
6 Instead of bargaining over prices, it may be tempting to set up the bargaining game so that countries 
bargain over national welfare, so that the larger country would end up with higher welfare than the 
small country. We defer this discussion to Section 4, where our simulations will help explain why it is 

























value of its output at free trade prices. This is no longer the case under Nash 
bargaining. With prices no longer being determined by market forces, if consumers 
choose their consumption bundle to maximise their utility given the Nash bargaining 
prices, then producers may have to change the quantities produced in order to clear 
the market. We make this assumption in what follows. We also make the further 
assumption that producers in both countries make their production decisions 
simultaneously. Figure 1 shows the timing of events in the model.  
 
Since the Nash bargaining prices are not equal to either country’s autarkic prices, 
producers in both countries would seek to specialise in their comparative advantage 
product. However, they will not be able to do so, since the Nash bargaining relative 
price of good 1 is higher than the market clearing price. The optimal production bundle 
will involve the smaller country Foreign being completely specialised in its comparative 
advantage good 2, while the larger country Home will be incompletely specialised. That 
is, Nash bargaining moves the world economy away from the first-best allocation, and 
the second-best allocation may involve further deviations from the first-best (Lipsey 
and Lancaster (1956))7.  
 
To formalise the remark above, from the production functions, total world output of 
goods 1 and 2 are given by:  
𝑄𝑄1
𝑊𝑊 = 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿1                               𝑄𝑄2𝑊𝑊 = 𝐿𝐿2 + 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿2∗ = 𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿1 + 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗  (8) 
Since output equals consumption for the world and relative prices are equal to Home’s 
autarkic prices, substituting into the consumer equilibrium condition (5) gives the 
labour allocation in Home between the two goods:  
𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿1 = � 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼� �𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝1�𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 �𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿1 + 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗�    (9a) 
𝐿𝐿1 = � 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼� �𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝1�𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 �𝐿𝐿 + 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗� �𝐴𝐴 + � 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼� �𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝1�𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁�−1  (9b) 
𝐿𝐿2 = 𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿1      (9c) 
Equation (9b) shows that the division of labour into the two sectors depends on the 
Nash bargaining price, and the endowments of the two countries. Comparing equation 
                                                          
7 To show that this must be the equilibrium allocation of production, consider a small deviation for the 
smaller country Foreign. This reduces Foreign’s output of good 2, and increases its output of good 1. 
However, this must be met by an equal and opposite adjustment in Home’s output (since prices and 
consumption are fixed). But such an adjustment must reduce the total value of world output, since each 
country is being asked to increase its output of its comparative disadvantage good, at the expense of its 
comparative advantage good.  
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(9a) with the equivalent equation under free trade (𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿1 = � 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼�𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿1 + 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗�)8, we 
can establish that 𝐿𝐿1
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 < 𝐿𝐿1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 (hence 𝐿𝐿2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝐿𝐿2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ≥ 0) since (𝑜𝑜2 𝑜𝑜1⁄ )𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 < 𝐴𝐴. That is, Home 
allocates more labour to good 2 under Nash bargaining than under free trade. In 
addition, the larger country Home is always incompletely specialised; the higher 
relative price of good 1 reduces relative consumption of good 1, which in turn requires 
a larger world output of good 2 than can be produced by the smaller country Foreign 
alone. The implications of this incomplete specialisation will be discussed further when 
we present simulations of the model in Section 4. 
 
3.2 Consumption, utility and trade 
 
Here, we solve for consumption and hence trade volume between the two countries. 
The Foreign country’s GDP is equal to the value of its output:  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
∗ = 𝐴𝐴(𝑜𝑜2)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿�∗     (10) 
Per capita consumption of the two goods in Foreign is therefore:  
𝐶𝐶1
∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃∗(𝑝𝑝1)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿�∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴 �𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝1�𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁                      𝐶𝐶2∗ = (1−𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃∗(𝑝𝑝2)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿�∗ = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴 (11) 
Note that, comparing Nash bargaining consumption with free trade consumption (𝐶𝐶1
∗ =
𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴2 and 𝐶𝐶2
∗ = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴), consumption of good 2 is the same, whereas Nash bargaining 
consumption of good 1 is always less than free trade consumption since (𝑜𝑜2 𝑜𝑜1⁄ )𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 <
𝐴𝐴. The smaller, completely specialised Foreign country is worse off under Nash 
bargaining than under free trade. Conversely, Foreign is better off under Nash 
bargaining than under autarky, since autarkic consumption is 𝐶𝐶1
∗ = 𝛼𝛼 and 𝐶𝐶2∗ =(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴.  
 
World market clearing allows us to back out Home per capita consumption as the 
difference between world output and total Foreign consumption, divided by the 
number of Home consumers:  
𝐶𝐶1 = �1𝐿𝐿� (𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿1 − 𝐶𝐶1∗𝐿𝐿�∗)     (12a) 
𝐶𝐶2 = �1𝐿𝐿� [𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗ + 𝐿𝐿2 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗] = �1𝐿𝐿� [𝐿𝐿2 + 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗]   (12b) 
Since 𝐿𝐿2
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝐿𝐿2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, we have 𝐶𝐶2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝐶𝐶2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, and since (𝑜𝑜2 𝑜𝑜1⁄ )𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 < 𝐴𝐴, we have 𝐶𝐶1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 < 𝐶𝐶2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹. 
That is, Home consumers consume more of good 2 and less of good 1 under Nash 
bargaining than under free trade, because the relative price of good 1 is higher under 
                                                          
8 All derivations of the expressions from the standard model are collected in Appendix B.  
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Nash bargaining than under free trade. Solving explicitly for 𝐶𝐶1 and 𝐶𝐶2 and substituting 
into the utility function (3) gives:  
𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = ��𝐴𝐴2𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴+𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴∗ ��𝐿𝐿+𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗�−𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗𝐿𝐿�(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝐴𝐴2𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴+𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴∗ �+𝛼𝛼� � �� 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴+𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴∗�𝛼𝛼 (1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼�   (13) 
Compared with utility under autarky (and free trade, assuming Home is incompletely 
specialised) 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 = 𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = (𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼, welfare under Nash bargaining is ambiguous; 
on the one hand, the first term on the right hand side of equation (13) is always greater 
than 1. On the other hand, the second term is less than 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴, since 𝐴𝐴
2𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 + 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴∗ > 1. Thus 
it is possible that international trade with prices determined by Nash bargaining, leads 
to a welfare loss for the larger Home country, relative to both free trade and autarky.  
 
The volume of trade is the sum of the difference between Foreign production and 
consumption of the two goods:  
𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗ �1 + �𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝1�𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁�     (14) 
The volume of trade is lower under Nash bargaining than under free trade, since 
𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗(1 + 𝐴𝐴).  
 
3.3 Winners and losers from trade 
 
In the Nash bargaining equilibrium the smaller country Foreign is completely 
specialised in good 2, whereas the larger country Home is incompletely specialised. 
Given free movement of labour between sectors, workers in the two sectors in Home 
will be paid identical wage rates. Hence the zero profit condition in sector 2 implies:  
𝑤𝑤1 = 𝑤𝑤2 = (𝑜𝑜2)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁     (15) 
It will be convenient to normalise this to unity. However, there exist supernormal 
profits in sector 1, since:  
𝜋𝜋1 = (𝑜𝑜1)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑄𝑄1 − 𝑤𝑤1𝐿𝐿1 = ((𝑜𝑜1)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴 − (𝑜𝑜2)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)𝐿𝐿1 > 0   (16) 
Where the second equality comes from substituting from the production function (4a) 
and equation (15), and the inequality comes from (𝑜𝑜1 𝑜𝑜2⁄ )𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > (𝑜𝑜1 𝑜𝑜2⁄ ) = 1/𝐴𝐴. There 
are at least three possible ways in which these supernormal profits may be distributed. 
The first possibility is that the profits are distributed equally to all workers in Home. 
In this case, all workers have the same total income, and the outcomes are as in the 
previous subsection.  
 
A second possible way in which the profits may be distributed, is to workers in sector 
1 only. In this case, from equations (15) and (16), total income per worker (wages plus 
profits) in sector 1 is, making use of the normalisation above,  
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𝜔𝜔1 = 𝐴𝐴(𝑜𝑜1 𝑜𝑜2⁄ )𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 1 = 𝑤𝑤2     (17) 
Would this not encourage workers in sector 2 to move to sector 1? No, because as 
shown in Figure 1, labour is allocated to the two sectors after consumption has been 
decided, so any additional workers in sector 1 would produce output which is not sold 
(and hence has zero value). They would be better off remaining in sector 2.  
 
Given homothetic preferences, equation (17) implies that each worker in sector 1 also 
consumes 𝜔𝜔1 𝑤𝑤2⁄  times as much of each good as each worker in sector 2. Total 
consumption in Home can be divided into consumption by the workers in the two 
sectors:  
𝐶𝐶1𝐿𝐿 = 𝐿𝐿1𝐶𝐶1𝐿𝐿1 + 𝐿𝐿2𝐶𝐶1𝐿𝐿2 = 𝐿𝐿1 �𝜔𝜔1𝑤𝑤2� 𝐶𝐶1𝐿𝐿2 + 𝐿𝐿2𝐶𝐶1𝐿𝐿2 = 𝐶𝐶1𝐿𝐿2 �𝐿𝐿1 �𝜔𝜔1𝑤𝑤2� + 𝐿𝐿2�  (18) 
Hence we can obtain consumption of the two goods by workers in each sector:  
𝐶𝐶1𝐿𝐿2 = 𝐶𝐶1𝐿𝐿 �𝐿𝐿1 �𝜔𝜔1𝑤𝑤2� + 𝐿𝐿2�−1 = 𝐶𝐶1𝑤𝑤2𝐿𝐿𝜔𝜔1𝐿𝐿1+𝑤𝑤2𝐿𝐿2 < 𝐶𝐶1   (19a) 
𝐶𝐶2𝐿𝐿2 = 𝐶𝐶2𝐿𝐿 �𝐿𝐿1 �𝜔𝜔1𝑤𝑤2� + 𝐿𝐿2�−1 = 𝐶𝐶2𝑤𝑤2𝐿𝐿𝜔𝜔1𝐿𝐿1+𝑤𝑤2𝐿𝐿2 < 𝐶𝐶2   (19b) 
𝐶𝐶1𝐿𝐿1 = 𝐶𝐶1𝐿𝐿 �𝜔𝜔1𝑤𝑤2� �𝐿𝐿1 �𝜔𝜔1𝑤𝑤2� + 𝐿𝐿2�−1 = 𝐶𝐶1𝜔𝜔1𝐿𝐿𝜔𝜔1𝐿𝐿1+𝑤𝑤2𝐿𝐿2 > 𝐶𝐶1  (19c) 
𝐶𝐶2𝐿𝐿1 = 𝐶𝐶2𝐿𝐿 �𝜔𝜔1𝑤𝑤2� �𝐿𝐿1 �𝜔𝜔1𝑤𝑤2� + 𝐿𝐿2�−1 = 𝐶𝐶2𝜔𝜔1𝐿𝐿𝜔𝜔1𝐿𝐿1+𝑤𝑤2𝐿𝐿2 > 𝐶𝐶2  (19d) 
Where the inequalities reflect the fact that 𝜔𝜔1 > 𝑤𝑤2. Thus workers in sector 1 earn and 
consume more than workers in sector 2; our simulations in Section 4 will shed more 
light on how these consumption levels compare with autarkic consumption.  
 
A final possible way in which to distribute the supernormal profits in sector 1, is that 
it is wasted in rent-seeking or lobbying activities, as is sometimes assumed in the trade 
policy literature (see Bagwell and Staiger (2002), Grossman and Helpman (2002)). If 
this is the case, then the remaining wage income implies low consumption levels by 
workers in both sectors, as given by equations (19a) and (19b).  
 
Given free trade in goods, the relative wage rate in the Foreign country is:  
𝑤𝑤∗
𝑤𝑤2
= 𝐴𝐴 ≷ 𝜔𝜔1
𝑤𝑤2




≶ 1   (20) 
That is, Foreign wages are always higher than Home wages in sector 2, and may also 
be higher than Home income in sector 1, 𝜔𝜔1 (under scenario 2 above), if the Nash 







To make the results clearer, we turn to simulations. We simulated the model with the 
following parameter values: 𝐴𝐴 = 2,𝛼𝛼 = 0.5, 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐿𝐿�∗ = 24. Wages in Home in sector 2 are 
normalised to unity. Fixing the total labour endowment in the world enables us to 
focus on the impact of relative sizes on world welfare. The results are summarised in 
Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2(a) shows that, as Home becomes larger relative to Foreign, 
the relative price of good 1 (in which Home has a comparative advantage) falls under 
free trade, until the Home country is so large that it is incompletely specialised under 
free trade, and the relative price is equal to Home’s autarkic relative price. However, 
under Nash bargaining, the relative price of good 1 rises as Home becomes larger. This 
figure shows the key effect of introducing Nash bargaining: it shifts the terms of trade 
in favour of the larger country, relative to free trade.  
 
Note another interesting feature of Figure 2(a). When 𝐿𝐿 = 12, this implies that 𝐿𝐿�∗ =12 as well. However, this does not mean that (𝑜𝑜1 𝑜𝑜2⁄ )𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 1. To see why, note that 
the formula for the Nash bargaining price (equation (7a)) is a weighted average of the 
two countries’ autarkic prices. Suppose that the two economies are the same size in 
autarky, so the weights are the same; then given 𝐴𝐴 = 2, the Nash bargaining price will 
be (𝑜𝑜1 𝑜𝑜2⁄ )𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = (0.5)(0.5) + (0.5)(2) = 1.25.9 But this implies that, after trade, if both 
countries are completely specialised, Home would have a larger economy than Foreign: (𝑜𝑜1)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 > (𝑜𝑜2)𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗. As shown in the discussion around equation (10), this implies 
that Home would be incompletely specialised, even when the two countries have the 
same labour endowment.  
 
Figure 2(b) shows the welfare effect of this shift in the terms of trade. When Home is 
only slightly bigger than Foreign, Home gains more from trade than does Foreign; this 
is the opposite of the standard result. As Home becomes larger relative to Foreign, 
both countries’ welfare decreases, with Home’s welfare decreasing faster than Foreign’s. 
The reason for this is that, as Home becomes larger relative to Foreign, it uses an 
increasing share of its labour in producing good 2, so the improvement in Home’s terms 
of trade actually harms the Home workers who produce good 2. When Home becomes 
                                                          
9 More formally, the free trade prices are based on the (weighted) geometric mean of the autarkic prices 
in the two countries, whereas the Nash bargaining prices are based on the (weighted) arithmetic mean 
of the autarkic prices.  
14 
 
incompletely specialised in free trade (𝐿𝐿 = 16), Foreign gains more from trade under 
Nash bargaining than Home. Indeed, when Home becomes very large relative to 
Foreign, Home is worse off under Nash bargaining than under free trade (and autarky). 
Figures 2(c) and 2(d) show that both the volume of trade and world welfare are lower 
under Nash bargaining than under free trade.  
 
 
Figure 2: Comparing Nash bargaining and free trade.  
Figure 2(a): Relative prices.  
 
 
Figure 2(b): Gains from trade. 
 
 
Figure 2(c): Volume of trade. 
 
Figure 2(d): World welfare.  
 










































































Figure 3: Details of the Nash bargaining equilibrium.  




Figure 3(b): 𝐿𝐿1 𝐿𝐿⁄  
 
 
Figure 3(c): Consumption of good 1.  
 
Figure 3(d): Consumption of good 2.  
 
Notes: Parameter values assumed: 𝐴𝐴 = 2,𝛼𝛼 = 0.5, 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐿𝐿�∗ = 24. 
 
An additional feature of Figure 2(b) is that, as the larger country Home becomes larger 
relative to Foreign, its welfare falls, regardless of whether relative prices are rising or 
falling10. This seems puzzling at first, but the reason for this is intuitive. Welfare is a 
                                                          
10 This explains why we have not attempted to set up the Nash bargaining model with countries 
bargaining over national welfare: there does not appear to be a price mechanism that would allow the 































































function of real income, that is, prices and output. Under free trade, as a country grows 
larger, its terms of trade move against it, and this more than offsets the increase in 
output from increased size. Under Nash bargaining, although the terms of trade move 
in favour of the larger country, it is forced to produce more of its comparative 
disadvantage good (as shown in the labour allocations in Figure 3(b)), hence reducing 
the value of its output.  
 
Figure 3 provides additional detail on the outcomes under Nash bargaining, under the 
assumption (as in section 3.3) that the profits in sector 1 are distributed only to 
workers in sector 1. Figure 3(a) shows that the larger is Home, the higher is the relative 
wage in sector 1 as compared to sector 2. However, at the same time GDP per capita 
is decreasing; this is because an increasing fraction of Home labour is allocated to sector 
2. This is shown in Figure 3(b). If Home is not too large relative to Foreign, Home will 
be completely specialised in good 1 under free trade, whereas under Nash bargaining, 
Home is always incompletely specialised, and always allocates a lower share of labour 
to sector 1 than under free trade. Indeed, by the time Home starts to allocate labour 
to good 2 under free trade, under Nash bargaining it already allocates half of its labour 
in good 2.  
 
Figures 3(c) and 3(d) show consumption of both goods by workers in the two sectors 
in Home (note that the autarkic consumption levels for Home are 𝐶𝐶1𝐴𝐴 = 1.0 and 𝐶𝐶2𝐴𝐴 =0.5). Since 𝜔𝜔1 > 𝑤𝑤2, workers in sector 1 always consume more of both goods than 
workers in sector 2. As Home becomes larger relative to Foreign, the relative price of 
good 1 rises, so consumption shifts towards good 2, and workers in sector 1 are better 
off. However, because an increasing fraction of Home labour is allocated to sector 2, 
overall consumption of both goods falls as Home becomes larger relative to Foreign. 
Workers in sector 1 are better off than under autarky; they consume the same amount 
of good 1, but more of good 2. On the other hand, workers in sector 2 are worse off 
than under autarky; they consume the same amount of good 2, but less of good 1. 
Hence our simulations make it clear that those who remain in the comparative 
advantage sector of the larger Home country will gain from Nash bargaining relative 
to free trade (and autarky), while those in the comparative disadvantage sector are 
worse off. This may be what creates an incentive for the Home government to engage 
in Nash bargaining, if the Home government is controlled by those in sector 1, even 
though the country as a whole may experience a welfare loss. Workers in Foreign are 
                                                          
observable, whereas utility is not, so in practice bargaining over prices would be much easier than 
bargaining over utilities.   
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always worse off under Nash bargaining than under free trade, but better off than 
under autarky (Figure 2(b)).  
 
Figure 4: Production, consumption and welfare under free trade and Nash bargaining.  
 
Notes: The fainter lines are for Home, the bold lines for Foreign. The solid lines and curves are for 
autarky and free trade, while the dashed lines and curves are for the Nash bargaining outcomes. 
Parameter values assumed: 𝐴𝐴 = 2,𝛼𝛼 = 0.5, 𝐿𝐿 = 18, 𝐿𝐿�∗ = 6. 
 
Figure 4 shows, in a conventional diagram of the production possibilities frontier and 
indifference curves, the production, consumption and welfare of the model when 𝐿𝐿 =18 and 𝐿𝐿�∗ = 6. The fainter lines are for Home, the bold lines for Foreign. The solid 
lines and curves are for the free trade equilibrium while the dashed lines and curves 
are for the Nash bargaining outcomes. The circles indicate free trade production points, 
the triangles free trade consumption points, the diamonds Nash bargaining production 
points, and the squares, Nash bargaining consumption points. Figure 4 illustrates all 
the results we have seen previously: the smaller country Foreign is much worse off as 
a result of Nash bargaining compared to free trade, while the larger country Home is 














Q_FT Q_A = C_A Q_NB




this is not a general result. Relative to the free trade outcome, under Nash bargaining 
the larger country Home allocates much more of its labour towards good 2. To improve 
Home welfare under Nash bargaining, the Home government may consider introducing 
a subsidy on the consumption of good 1 and a tax on the consumption of good 2; this 
would have the effect of shifting some Home labour into good 1, and likely lead to 




This paper develops a model of international trade based on Ricardian comparative 
advantage, in which free trade prices are determined, not by market forces, but by 
governments bargaining. The bargaining power of a country depends on the size of its 
economy. As a result, and unlike in standard trade models, free trade prices are biased 
in favour of the larger country. We find empirical support for the prediction that larger 
countries have more favourable terms of trade. Despite this, the larger country need 
not necessarily gain from trade, because the equilibrium implies that the larger country 
will be incompletely specialised, and hence allocate some of its labour to its less 
productive (and now disadvantaged) sector. Hence our results demonstrate once again 
how general equilibrium adjustment may influence our evaluation of a policy which 
appears to be beneficial for a country in partial equilibrium. The real cost of the Nash 
bargaining approach falls on the smaller country, which is unambiguously worse off 
than under free trade (albeit still better off than under autarky).  
 
In this paper we have made use of the one-factor, perfect competition model of trade 
based on Ricardian comparative advantage. Even with such a simple setup, the model 
yields some interesting additional results. For example, the volume of trade is lower 
than would be predicted by the standard model, and so may go some way towards 
addressing Trefler’s (1995) case of the missing trade. It also yields lower gains from 
trade than in the standard model, and hence may speak to the recent literature on the 
gains from trade (e.g. Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014), Melitz and Redding 
(2014)).  
 
However, it is possible to argue that the results of the model hold more generally for 
models in which the gains from trade at least partly arise from differences in relative 
prices between autarky and free trade. For instance, this would be true for the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model. It would also be true for the model of international trade under 
monopolistic competition with non-CES utility (as in Krugman 1979, but not Krugman 
1980, where CES utility implies that firms charge the same prices both before and after 
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trade). In these models, as with the present model, the standard result is that the 
terms of trade are more favourable to the small country than to the large one. This 
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Appendix A: Additional regression results 
 
In this Appendix we report the results of two additional sensitivity analyses which are 
not reported in the text. First, Figure 1 suggests a nonlinear relationship between (the 
natural log of) GDP and the terms of trade. We therefore include a quadratic term for 
GDP in the regression equation:  ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1 ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2(ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)2 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (A1) 
A significant estimate of 𝛾𝛾2 would indicate the presence of a nonlinear relationship. 
The second sensitivity analysis we report here, is to include a lagged dependent variable 
in the model, giving:  ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1 ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3 ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (A2) 
The idea behind including the lagged dependent variable is that the best predictor of 
the current terms of trade, is the previous terms of trade. The lagged dependent 
variable would also capture the effects of other variables which may have been omitted 
from the analysis. It is well-known (see Baltagi (2013)) that including a lagged 
dependent variable leads to biased fixed effects estimates (the “Nickell” bias, Nickell 
(1981)). However, as Judson and Owen (1999) note, the bias decreases in size the larger 
the time dimension of the dataset. Since our dataset has a relatively large time 
dimension, we make use of the same estimation methods as in the text.  
 
Table A1: Additional regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 FE FE FE FE ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.276 -0.061 0.036 0.097 
 (0.295) (0.410) (0.012)*** (0.017)*** (ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)2 -0.000 0.008   
 (0.006) (0.009)   ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1   0.865 0.709 
   (0.014)*** (0.020)*** 
R-squared  0.48 0.75 0.87 0.88 
NxT  4,394 4,394 4,203 4,203 
N 194 194 192 192 
T 35  35  35  35  
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country time trend  Yes  Yes 
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. 




The results are reported in Table A1. In columns (1) and (2), there is no evidence of 
any nonlinear relationship between the terms of trade and GDP. The apparent 
nonlinearity in Figure 4 has been absorbed by the country and year fixed effects in 
Table A1. In columns (3) and (4), lagged terms of trade, as expected, have a large and 
highly significant effect on current terms of trade. That the coefficient is close to but 
less than 1 indicates evidence of mean-reversion. Including lagged terms of trade in the 
regression reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on GDP, but does not change the 
sign or significance of the coefficient; GDP remains positively and significantly 
associated with the terms of trade.  
 
Appendix B: The model in autarky and free trade 
 
In this Appendix we show the results of the standard Ricardian model under both 




With perfectly competitive markets and free movement of labour between sectors in a 
country, there is a single equilibrium wage rate in each country. From the firm’s zero 
profit condition, we have the relationship between prices and wages:  
𝑤𝑤 = 𝑜𝑜1𝐴𝐴 = 𝑜𝑜2                               𝑤𝑤∗ = 𝑜𝑜1∗ = 𝑜𝑜2∗𝐴𝐴   (B1) 
Substituting this into the consumer’s first order condition gives the relationship 









                              𝑝𝑝1∗
𝑝𝑝2
∗ = 𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼 𝐶𝐶2∗𝐶𝐶1∗   (B2) 
Since consumption equals output in autarky, substituting from the production 
functions and labour market clearing gives the labour used in each sector:  
𝐿𝐿2 = 𝐿𝐿� − 𝐿𝐿1 = 1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝐿𝐿1            ↔            𝐿𝐿1 = 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�           𝐿𝐿2 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐿𝐿� (B3a) 
𝐿𝐿1
∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿�∗           𝐿𝐿2∗ = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐿𝐿�∗ (B3b) 
The share of good 1 in consumer expenditure is 𝛼𝛼. Hence the per capita quantity of 
good 1 consumed is:  
𝐶𝐶1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝1 = 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴                               𝐶𝐶1∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤∗𝑝𝑝1∗ = 𝛼𝛼    (B4) 
and the per capita quantity of good 2 consumed is:  
𝐶𝐶2 = (1−𝛼𝛼)𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝2  = 1 − 𝛼𝛼                     𝐶𝐶2∗ = (1−𝛼𝛼)𝑤𝑤∗𝑝𝑝2∗ = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴   (B5) 
Substituting these into the utility function gives:  




B.2 Free trade under complete specialisation 
 
Suppose that each country is specialised in its comparative advantage good: Home in 










     (B7) 
Notice that, all else being equal, the larger is a country, the lower will be the relative 
price of the good which it exports. Note also that, from equation (B1) relating prices 
to wages, the relative wage between the two countries is also equal to the relative price 
in equation (B7).  
 
Since Home is specialised in good 1, the quantity of good 1 consumed is the same as 
in autarky, while the rest is exported to Foreign:  
𝐶𝐶1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝1 = 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴                                         𝐶𝐶1∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤∗𝑝𝑝1 = 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴 �𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝1�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  (B8) 
Now, however, Home does not produce good 2, and has to import it from Foreign at 
the free trade price. Hence, the quantity of good 2 consumed in the two countries is:  
𝐶𝐶2 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) �𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝2� = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴�𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝2�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹   (B9a) 
𝐶𝐶2
∗ = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) �𝑤𝑤∗
𝑝𝑝2
� = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴    (B9b) 
 Hence utility under free trade is:  
𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = (𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼 �(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴 �𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝2�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹�1−𝛼𝛼    (B10a) 
𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹





𝛼𝛼 [(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴]1−𝛼𝛼    (B10b) 
Comparing utility under autarky with utility under free trade, we have:  




∗ = �𝐴𝐴 �𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝1�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹�𝛼𝛼 = �𝐴𝐴 1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿�∗�𝛼𝛼   (B11b) 
The gains from trade are larger, the smaller is the country, and the greater the 
technological difference between the two countries.  
 
With both countries completely specialised, Home produces 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿� units of good 1, and 
consumes 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿� units, hence exports (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿� units of good 1. It does not produce 
good 2, but consumes (hence imports) 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗ units of good 2. Therefore the volume of 
trade is:  
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𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿� +  𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗     (B12) 
 
B.3 Free trade under incomplete specialisation 
 
If one country is much larger than the other, then in free trade the larger country will 
be incompletely specialised, while the smaller country will be specialised in its 
comparative advantage good. Without loss of generality, let Home be the larger 







                     ↔                      𝐿𝐿 > 𝐴𝐴 � 𝛼𝛼
1−𝛼𝛼
� 𝐿𝐿�∗   (B13) 
The smaller country Foreign is specialised in good 2, while the larger country Home 
produces both goods 1 and 2. Therefore, free trade prices are equal to Home’s autarkic 
prices given in equation (B2). And, since goods prices are equalised across countries, 
we have 𝑤𝑤1 = 𝑤𝑤2 = 𝑤𝑤∗ 𝐴𝐴⁄ ; that is, if 𝐴𝐴 > 1, (nominal and real) wages are higher in 
Foreign than in Home.  
 
From the production functions, total world output of goods 1 and 2 are given by:  
𝑄𝑄1
𝑊𝑊 = 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿1                               𝑄𝑄2𝑊𝑊 = 𝐿𝐿2 + 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿2∗ = 𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿1 + 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗  (B14) 
Since output equals consumption for the world and relative prices are equal to Home’s 
autarkic prices, substituting into the consumer equilibrium condition (B2) gives:  
𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿1 = � 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼�𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿1 + 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗�    (B15) 
Which gives the labour allocation in Home between the two goods:  
𝐿𝐿1 = 𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿 + 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗�                     𝐿𝐿2 = 𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿1 = 𝐿𝐿 − 𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿 + 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗�  (B16) 
Substituting these into the production functions gives the quantity of the two goods 
produced. Next, we solve for consumption and hence trade volume between the two 
countries. The Foreign country’s GDP is equal to the value of its output:  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜2𝐿𝐿�∗     (B17) 




= 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴2                               𝐶𝐶2∗ = (1−𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃∗𝑝𝑝2𝐿𝐿�∗ = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴  (B18) 
Hence, making use of world market clearing, we have:  
𝐶𝐶1 = �1𝐿𝐿� (𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿1 − 𝐶𝐶1∗𝐿𝐿�∗) = 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴    (B19a) 
𝐶𝐶2 = �1𝐿𝐿� [𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗ + 𝐿𝐿2 − 𝐶𝐶2∗𝐿𝐿�∗] = �1𝐿𝐿� [𝐿𝐿2 + 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿�∗] = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)   (B19b) 
Substituting consumption into the utility function (3) gives:  
𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = (𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼                               𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹∗ = (𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴2)𝛼𝛼[(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴]1−𝛼𝛼  (B20) 
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Comparing these with the autarkic utility in equations (B6) shows the standard result 
that the large, incompletely specialised Home does not gain from trade, while the small, 
completely specialised Foreign gains from trade. The volume of trade is the sum of the 
difference between Foreign production and consumption of the two goods:  
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